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Article 5

RECENT CASE NOTES
BANKRUPTCY-LIENS-UNRECORDED MoRTGAGE-The bankrupt executed
a chattel mortgage. No notice of intention to execute such mortgage had
been recorded. The mortgage was then recorded at a later date than its

execution. A year later the mortgagor filed a voluntary petition in bank-ruptcy. In this bankruptcy proceeding three classes of creditors are represented. 1. Those existing at the date of the mortgage; 2. those who became such between the date of the mortgage and its recording; 3. those
so becoming subsequent to the recording of the mortgage. For the purpose of the points herein involved, the California statute which governed
the mortgage, made it void as to creditors of the first and second class
because of the failure to record notice of intention, but valid as to creditors of the third class. The trustee in bankruptcy now contends that the
mortgage is also void as to the third class at the suit of the trustee, and,
according to the opinion of the lower court, bases his contention on section 70 e of the Bankruptcy Act. The United States Supreme Court held
1
the mortgage void as to the third class, reversing the holding below.
The reasoning of the court in the principal case is very unsatisfactory.
At the outset the court says, "The trustee gets title to all property which
has been transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors or which prior
to the petition he could by any means have transferred or which might
have been levied on and sold under federal process against him." This
is a summarization of 70a (4) (5) of the Act.
The wording of the California statute involved here was "will be conclusively presumed to be fraudulent and void as against the existing creditors, etc." It is true there is authority holding that the fraud involved
in section 70a (4) includes fraud by statute law, or by any other rule of law
2
of the state.
Section 70a (4) provides the trustee gets title to property transferred
by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors. Does this mean that the
validity of a lien on such property is to disregarded? It is submitted
it does not. Section 70e takes care of a situation in which less than all
creditors have the right to avoid a transfer. Knapp v. Milwaukee Trst
Co., supra, was a case of a transfer void as to all creditors. The syllabus
to Bush v. Export Storage Co., supra, contains the following statement
which is borne out by the opinion. "The title which passes to a trustee
under 70a (4) is limited to such property as might have been recovered
by creditors, in whose right the trustee takes, under the laws of the state,
and as may be recovered by him under 70e. This amounts to saying that
under 70a (4) the trustees rights are the same as the creditors' rights.
Evidently, the court in the principal case did not intend to innovate the
doctrine that section 70a (4) means that the validity of a lien is to be
disregarded. It did not go beyond a brief statement of section 70a (4);
1

Moore v. Bay (1931), 52 Sup. Ct. 3.
2Bush v. Export Storage Co. (1904), 136 Fed. 918, 14 A. B. R. 141; and see
Knapp v. Milwaukee Tru-t Co. (1910), 216 U. S. 545, 24 A. B. B. 761, 54 L. Ed. 610,
30 Sup. Ct. 412.
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it did not specifically say anything that could be construed as supporting
such doctrine; it did not cite any authority supporting such a doctrine. It
is noteworthy that the principal case, apparently, is not decided on the
3
basis of fraud.
Section 70a (4) stated briefly by the court is of no assistance in this
case. This subdivision states what property rights of the bankrupt passes
to the trustee. Nothing contained therein operates to extinguish the extent
of the validity of an encumbrance on property of the bankrupt. The lien
in the present case can no more be said to be void than it can be said to
be valid. To say a lien is void impliedly precludes the possibility of any
validity. Each term used unqualifiedly, excludes the other. The lien here
was valid to some extent and void to some extent.
The court goes on to say "by section 67 a claim which for want of
record or for other reasons would not have been valid liens as against
the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his
estate." It may be plausibly argued that since the mortgage was a "valid
lien as against the claims of 'some' of the creditors of the bankrupt,"
67a does not apply. If in reply to this it is contended that this would
be reading something into 67a arbitrarily, so as to make it read "claims
which * * * would not have been valid liens as against all the creditors * * * shall not be valid liens * * *," then the same argument would nullify the contention that 67a must read "claim which * * *
would not have been valid liens as against some of the creditors * * *
shall not be valid liens * * *." It would seem that when "the creditors" of a person are spoken of generally, all the creditors are those to
whom it is thus referred. It is submitted that a sound restatement of
67a would be this: Any claim which for any reason would not have been
a valid lien as against the claims of all the creditors of the bankrupt, excluding the claimant, shall not be a lien against the bankrupt's estate. The
exclusion of the claimant in this statement does not add anything which
is not by necessary inference in 67a.
S. K.

CONSTITuTIONAL LAw-VESTED RIGHT IN REMEDY-The appellant was
indicted on September 12, 1930, for the alleged robbery of a bank on
August 26, 1927. At the time of the commission of the alleged offense section 20, c. 6, Acts of 1905-Section 2052, Burns' 1926--provided that
prosecutions for such offenses must be commenced within two years. On
May 19, 1929, the above statute was repealed by section 1, c. 198, Acts
of 1929, which provided that the period of limitation should be enlarged to
five years. The appellant contends that the prosecution was barred by
the statute of limitations that was in effect at the time of the commission
of the offense. Held, the prosecution is not barred; statutes of limitations
pertain to remedy, and there is no vested right in a remedy or mode of
procedure.1
aSee further, on 70a (4) In re Mullen (1900), 101 Fed. 413, where the court
held that 70e (4) did not preclude the gaining of rights superior to the trustees;
this is mentioned only to show that 70a (4) does not confer an unlimited right.
1 Streepy v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, October 13, 1931, 177 N. E. 897.

